ABSTRACT Cloud storage has been gaining tremendous popularity, which provides facilitative data storage and sharing services for distributed clients. To maximize the availability and reliability, some customers may store multiple replicas of critical data on cloud servers. However, cloud servers may collude to make it look like they are storing multiple copies of data, whereas in fact they only store a single copy. Currently, several multi-replica provable data possession schemes have been proposed to provide verifications to ensure that all the outsourced copies are actually stored and maintained intact. For these schemes with third-party verifications, correctly choosing public keys of data owners relies on the public key infrastructure (PKI), which is complicated and resource consuming. In this paper, we propose a novel identity-based public multireplica provable data possession scheme (IDPMR-PDP) to provide third-party verification of outsourced data with multiple replicas without PKI. We also introduce a formal security model of identity-based public multi-replica PDP schemes and prove that the IDPMR-PDP is secure against malicious cloud servers and privacy-preserving against curious verifiers under this model. Meanwhile, our analyses and simulation results demonstrate that the IDPMR-PDP realizes efficient integrity verification.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rising popularity of cloud computing and its evergrowing versatility, it is no surprise that an increasing number of individuals and organizations have integrated their data and services into the clouds. They use the clouds in a variety of service models (with acronyms such as SaaS, PaaS, and IaaS) and deployment models (private, public, hybrid, and community) [1] . Cloud storage saves enterprises a tremendous amount of money in IT investments, such as purchasing, management and maintenance of hardware. Meanwhile, with benefits like higher flexibility, automatic software updates, increased collaboration and the freedom to work from anywhere, cloud storage has been gaining its prevalence in our daily life. These high demands have stimulated the cloud service providers to offer affordable, elastic and remotely-accessible cloud storages, which thrives as a profit growth point in cloud computing. However, cloud storage is a double-edged sword. It brings great convenience, whereas some inherent security risks. When individuals and organizations outsource their data to the cloud storage, they do not possess the data locally anymore and lose their ability to have physical access to the servers hosting their data. These third-parties holding their sensitive business data may not be working in their best interest and may not be mandatory to report data errors. To be worse, they may conceal data loss incidents to maintain their reputation, or discard rarely accessed data to save storage costs, etc. In 2016, the cloud security alliance (CSA) listed the ''Treacherous 12'', i.e., the top 12 cloud computing threats which individuals and organizations face [2] . This investigation ranked ''data breaches'' and ''data loss'' 1st and 8th respectively out of 12 top threats in cloud computing.
A. RELATED WORK
For the data owners, to confirm that their data is being stored and maintained intact, it is necessary to develop efficient integrity verification techniques to strengthen their confidence in cloud storage. In 2007, Ateniese et al. proposed a probabilistically accurate data integrity verification method namely provable data possession, i.e., PDP, which enables data owners to check the integrity of their outsourced data remotely without downloading the entire files [3] .
Following this pioneering work, many PDP schemes have been proposed [4] - [18] .
Among these works, [13] - [18] allow the data owners with limited computation and communication power to delegate the remote integrity checking tasks to third-party verifiers. They also achieved privacy-preserving verification against the semi-trusted third-party verifiers who may be curious about the owners' data. However, to confirm if the data is uploaded by a certain owner, the aforementioned schemes rely on the public key certificates issued by Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which ensures authenticity of public keys whereas introduces some other problems. On the one hand, PKI is complicated and the managements of certificates, such as delivery, renewal and revocation, are resource consuming. On the other hand, the security of PKI itself may be vulnerable [19] .
To eliminate the burden involved by PKI, some PDP schemes, like [20] - [22] , resort to the identity-based cryptosystem, in which the public keys of data owners are simply their identities, like names and e-mall addresses. In these schemes, trusted PKGs (Private Key Generators) generate the private keys for all the data owners corresponding to their identities. As a result, data owners' public keys can be self-authenticated without verifying their certificates. Among these schemes, Wang [20] proposed the first ID-based PDP scheme in multi-cloud storage. Although it is vulnerable for some security flaws, it is later fixed by Peng et al. [23] . Wang et al. [21] proposed an ID-based PDP scheme allows the data owners to delegate the data uploading and integrity checking to their proxies; Yu et al. [22] proposed an ID-based PDP scheme with perfect data privacy-preserving which is proven secure against malicious servers and curious verifiers.
In another scenario, to maximize the availability and reliability, some data owners may store multiple replicas of critical data on cloud servers. However, cloud servers may collude to make it look like they are storing multiple copies of the data, whereas in fact they only store a single copy. To prevent this collusion attack, data owners may encrypt all the outsourced replicas and apply any PDP scheme that ensures possession of a single file replica for each copy, but this trivial solution invokes heavy computation cost. Several multi-replica provable data possession schemes [24] - [27] have been proposed to provide verifications of all the outsourced copies are actually stored and maintained intact. Among these works, Curtmola et al. [24] proposed the first multi-replica PDP scheme derived from [3] . They also introduced two security guarantees of multi-replica PDP schemes namely MRG1 and MRG2, but their definitions are informal; Barsoum et al. proposed two multi-replica PDP schemes based on Merkle hash tree and map-version table respectively [25] , and they also proposed a multi-replica PDP scheme [26] by utilizing BLS homomorphic linear authenticators [28] ; Liu et al. [27] proposed a multi-replica PDP scheme based on multi-replica Merkle hash tree. Meanwhile, [25] - [27] achieve privacypreserving public verifiability. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no multi-replica PDP scheme provides detailed security proofs or provides public verification on multiple data copies without PKI.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

1)
We propose a novel identity-based public multireplica provable data possession scheme, namely IDPMR-PDP, to provide third-party verification of outsourced data with multiple replicas without PKI. 2) We introduce a formal security model of public multireplica PDP schemes and provide detailed security proofs of our IDPMR-PDP, including the soundness and privacy-preserving properties under this model. 3) We provide analyses and simulation results to demonstrate that our IDPMR-PDP is practical for real-world applications.
C. PAPER ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews some preliminaries of this paper. Section III presents the system model and security model of IDPMR-PDP. Section IV proposes the detailed construction of IDPMR-PDP. Section V gives the detailed analyses of IDPMR-PDP in terms of computation and communication costs. Section VI proposes the detailed security proofs the security of IDPMR-PDP. Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the bilinear pairings. Let G 1 , G 2 and G T be three cyclic multiplicative groups with the same prime order q and let g 1 be a generator of G 1 , let g 2 be a generator of G 2 . Let e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a bilinear map [29] which satisfies the following properties:
3) Computability. For any u ∈ G 1 and v ∈ G 2 , there exists an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v).
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, we present the system model and security model of our scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL IDPMR-PDP involves four entities: the private key generator (PKG), the data owner (owner), the public verifier (verifier) and the cloud server (cloud). The PKG outputs the corresponding private key when receiving the identity of the owner. The owner creates the data and stores it in the cloud. The verifier is a third party to provide verification service for the owner. The cloud stores the owner's data and provides data access to the owner and, maybe, the other data users. Furthermore, we assume that the owner possesses a large raw data file, splits the file into smaller blocks and stores the blocks with multiple replicas in the cloud. Before presenting the definition of our scheme, we first define some notations as listed in Table 1 , which will be used in our following models and constructions.
Definition 1 (Identity-Based Public Multi-Replica Provable Data Possession): IDPMR-PDP is comprised of six phases: The architecture of IDPMR-PDP is described in Fig. 1 .
B. SECURITY MODEL
We assume that the PKG is a trusted authority and the communication between the PKG and the owner is secure. We also assume that the verifier is semi-trusted, i.e., the verifier performs verifications honestly on behalf of the owner and never colludes with the cloud, but is curious about the content of the owner's data during the verification procedure. However, the cloud could be untrusted and may forge tags, replicas and proofs to cheat the verifier and the owner. Meanwhile, when the owner stores data with multiple replicas, cloud servers may collude to make it look like they are storing multiple copies, whereas in fact they only store a single copy.
To solve these problems, we define a security model of public multi-replica PDP schemes including two security properties namely soundness and privacy-preserving.
1) SOUNDNESS
A secure PDP scheme should be sound as defined by Shacham and Waters [28] . However, the soundness property of a secure multi-replica PDP scheme should be stronger, which consists of two guarantees, i.e., (a) all the challenged replicas can be retrieved from a cloud which convinces the verifier and (b) if (a) is true, then all the retrieved replicas are actually stored by the cloud, i.e., the cloud cannot cheat by storing fewer replicas and deriving replicas from the existing ones, namely retrievable and unmalleable respectively, are defined as below:
Definition 2 (Retrievable): For any probabilistic polynomial adversary A (malicious cloud), if A passes a verification on some replica blocks, then a challenger C can construct a polynomial-time extractor to retrieve these verified replica blocks, except possibly negligible probability. In IDPMR-PDP, the 4-phase security game between A and C can be described as follows:
1) C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain some public parameters, a master private key α and a corresponding master public key mpk. C forwards params and mpk to A and keeps α secret. .., σ n } and forwards them to A. 3) For any M on which it previously made a ReplicaGen query and TagGen query, A can undertake executions of the GenProof phase by specifying the identities ID and the filenames name. In these executions, C plays the part of the verifier V and A plays the part of the prover P. When an execution completes, A is provided with the output of V . These executions can be arbitrarily interleaved with each other and with the ReplicaGen Queries and TagGen Queries described above. 4) A chooses an identity ID * and a file M * under a file name name * and a replica number c * . ID * must not have appeared in Extract Queries and there exist a ReplicaGen query on (M * , name * , c * ) and a TagGen query on (ID * , M * , name * ). A outputs the description of a prover P * . The cheating prover P * is -admissible if it convincingly answer fraction of verification challenges, i.e., if
≥ . The probability here is over the coins of the verifier and the prover. A wins the game if it can successfully output a -admissible prover P * . We say an identity-based public multi-replica PDP scheme is -retrievable if there exists an efficient extraction algorithm Extr such that, for every adversary A, whenever A, playing the game defined above, outputs an -admissible prover P * on an identity ID * and a file M * under a file name name * and a replica number c * , Extr recovers the replica files {F * 1 , . . . , F * c * } of M * from P * , i.e., Extr(param, ID * , name * , c * , P * ) = {F * 1 , . . . , F * c * }, except possibly with negligible probability. Definition 3 (Unmalleable): For any probabilistic polynomial adversary A (malicious clouds), the probability that A wins the 3-phase security game is negligible. In IDPMR-PDP, the game between the adversary A and the challenger C can be described as follows: 1) Setup. C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain some public parameters and chooses a random replica-generation key κ. 
2) PRIVACY-PRESERVING
For an public PDP scheme, the privacy-preserving property guarantees that the verifier cannot learn any information of any raw data file from the replica data file, the public information or the interactions with the cloud.
Definition 4 (Privacy-preserving): For any probabilistic polynomial adversary A (semi-trusted verifier), the probability that A wins the 5-phase security game is 1/2 ± ε with a negligible ε. In IDPMR-PDP, the game between the adversary A and the challenger C can be described as follows: 1) Setup. C runs Setup(1 k ) to obtain some public parameters, a master private key α and a corresponding master public key mpk. Then C forwards params and mpk to A. 2) First-Phase Queries. A submits an identity ID, a filename name, a block number n, a replica number c, a replica-generation key κ and a raw data file M = (m 1 , . . . , m n ) to C. By running ReplicaGen(params, M , κ, name, c), C obtains the corresponding replica files (m 1,1 , . . . , m 1,n * ) to C. C chooses a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. By running ReplicaGen(params, M β , κ * , name * , c * ), C obtains the corresponding replica files
By running Extract(params, ID * , α), C obtains the corresponding private key sk * . By running TagGen(params, ID * , sk * , mpk, M β , name * ), C obtains the corresponding tags {σ β,1 , . . . , σ β,n }. Then A runs Challenge(params, ID * , mpk, name * ) to obtain a challenge token chal * and forwards it to C. By running GenProof(params, {b β,i,j }, {σ β,i }, name * , c * , chal * ), C generates a response R β and forwards it to A. 4) Second-Phase Queries. Identical to the First-Phase Queries. 5) Guess. A output a guess bit β . A wins if β = β.
IV. CONSTRUCTION
Inspired by ID-based RDIC [22] , we designed IDPMR-PDP to achieve multi-replica verification with the soundness and privacy-preserving properties defined above against malicious servers and semi-trusted verifiers respectively. First, we provide the rationale behind IDPMR-PDP as follows:
1) The raw data file M which the owner uploaded to the cloud is comprised of n blocks with each block is comprised of c replica blocks. The verifier selects n challenged blocks, asks the cloud to respond the proof of data possession for these blocks with their replicas.
2) The verifier checks to the cloud's response, if valid, then (a) according to the soundness property defined in Section III-B, there exists an efficient algorithm Extr to recover allñ challenged raw blocks with all the correspondingñc replica blocks, and (b) according to the privacy-preserving property defined in Section III-B, the verifier cannot learn any information of any raw data block from the replica blocks, the public information or the interactions with the cloud.
3) The verification procedure does not rely on the owner's public key. Meanwhile, for a single verification procedure, the verifier challenges and verifiesñc replica blocks simultaneously, for about only 1/c computation and communication costs, comparing to the traditional PDP schemes.
Then we propose the detailed construction of IDPMR-PDP: params, α, mpk) . Given a security parameter k, The PKG chooses three cyclic multiplicative groups G 1 , G 2 and G T with the same prime order q > 2 k along with a bilinear map e :
Let g be a generator of G 2 . The PKG also chooses three cryptographic hash functions
q and a cryptographic pseudo-random permutation π : Z * q × {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n}. Then the PKG chooses a random number α ∈ Z * q as the master private key, sets mpk = g α as the master public key, sets owner chooses a random number η ∈ Z * q , sets r = g η , produces an identity-based signature IDS(r||name) on r||name. Then the owner produces n tags {σ 1 , . . . , σ n } with each σ i = sk m i H 2 (name||i) η and forwards ({σ i }, r, IDS(r||name)) to the cloud. As we mentioned before, {σ i } are generated from the raw data blocks {m i }. 5) Challenge(params, ID, mpk, name) → chal. Suppose that the verifier wants to checkñ of n blocks with allñc replicas under ID and name. The verifier chooses a random number ρ ∈ Z * q and three temporary keys τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ∈ Z * q , sets c 1 = g ρ , c 2 = e(H 1 (ID), mpk) ρ and the challenge token chal = (name, c 1 , c 2 ,ñ, τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 ) . Then the verifier forwards chal to the cloud. ρ must be generated freshly and must be kept secret from the cloud. 6) GenProof(params, {b i,j }, {σ i }, name, c, chal) → R.
After receiving the challenge token chal, the cloud computes . (1) A. CORRECTNESS Now we show the correctness of IDPMR-PDP. If the PKG, the owner, the verifier and the cloud run all the phases described above correctly, we have
j=1 i∈I Then (1) is derived.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In this section, we analyze the performance of our IDPMR-PDP from the computation and communication costs and compare them with the other up-to-date PDP protocols.
A. COMPUTATION
We compare the computation costs between our scheme and TB-DMCPDP [25] , MB-DMCPDP [25] , PB-PMDP [26] , MuR-DPA [27] and ID-based RDIC [22] . We summarize the result in Table 2 . Notes: 1) C exp denotes the time cost of single exponentiation on the group G 1 , G 2 or G T , C mul denotes the time cost of single multiplication on the group G 1 , G 2 or G T , C e denotes the time cost of single bilinear pairing, C H denotes the time cost of single hash operation on a data block, C enc denotes the time cost of single symmetric encryption on the raw data file, C ψ denotes the time costs of single pseudo-random function on a string, n denotes the raw data block number, c denotes the replica number, s denotes the sector number,ñ denotes the challenged block number. 2) We omit the time costs of generating and verifying a signature on the MHT root or the file name, because they are the common operations in all the compared schemes. 3) In TagGen, GenProof and CheckProof phases, comparing to C exp , C mul , C e and C H , the other operations (such as pseudo-random functions, multiplications and additions on the group Z * q ) are negligible, which we do not consider them in the computation analyses. It is also the reason why we do not consider the computation costs invoked by checking the verification paths in TB-DMCPDP [25] and MuR-DPA [27] which support dynamic updates. Meanwhile, comparing to TagGen, GenProof and CheckProof phases, the Extract and Challenge phases are extremely fast, which we do not consider them either. 4) Because ID-based RDIC [22] does not support verifying the replica blocks simultaneously, we apply the trivial solution, i.e., to encrypt and verify each replica respectively. Analyses: 1) In the comparison of computation costs, our scheme has the fastest TagGen phase among those of the other ones when the replica number c > 1. Independent to c, our IDPMR-PDP needs only one set of tags to verify all the replica blocks. 2) Meanwhile, our scheme has the fastest CheckProof phase among those of the other ones when the replica number c > 1, independent to c. 3) Our ReplicaGen phase is almost as fast as that of MuR-DPA [27] and faster than those of the other schemes, because pseudo-random functions on strings are faster than symmetric encryptions on the entire raw data file. For it may be nonintuitive, please refer to Section V-C for the detailed simulations. 4) Our GenProof phase is slightly slower than those of TB-DMCPDP [25] , MB-DMCPDP [25] and PB-PMDP [26] , but considering the strong computation power of cloud servers, it is still acceptable. 5) Meanwhile, our scheme does not suffer from resourceconsuming certificate management.
B. COMMUNICATION
We compare the communication costs between our IDPMR-PDP and TB-DMCPDP [25] , MB-DMCPDP [25] , PB-PMDP [26] , MuR-DPA [27] and ID-based RDIC [22] . We summarize the result in Table 3 .
Notes: 1) 1G 1 denotes the size of one element of G 1 in bits, 1G 2 denotes the size of one element of G 2 in bits, 1G T denotes the size of one element of G T in bits, 1Int denotes the size of one small integer (an index) in bits, 1Hash denotes the size of one map-to-binary hash value in bits, 1Sig denotes the size of one digital signature in bits, n denotes the raw data block number, c denotes the replica number, s denotes the sector number,ñ denotes the challenged block number. 2) TB-DMCPDP [25] and MuR-DPA [27] need to transfer verification paths to support dynamic updates, which are not implemented in PB-PMDP [26] , ID-based RDIC [22] and our IDPMR-PDP. To be fair, we omits the communication costs invoked by this auxiliary data. 3) Because ID-based RDIC [22] does not support verifying the replica blocks simultaneously, we apply the trivial solution, i.e., to encrypt and verify each replica respectively. Analyses: 1) In the comparison of communication costs, it is obvious that our GenProof phase has the smallest communication cost among those of the other ones. Independent to the replica number c and the challenged block numberñ, the cloud transfers only one element in G 2 , one hash value and one signature to the verifier during a single GenProof phase.
2) The communication cost of our Challenge phase is slightly larger than those of TB-DMCPDP [25] , MB-DMCPDP [25] and PB-PMDP [26] , but the differences are small and constant. 3) Meanwhile, our scheme does not suffer from resourceconsuming certificate management.
C. SIMULATIONS
We give detailed simulations between our IDPMR-PDP, MuR-DPA [27] and ID-based RDIC [22] with the comparisons of the computation and communication costs. The simulations were conducted on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-2600 @ 3.40GHz. The cryptographic algorithms are implemented using PBC library [30] on an MNT d159 curve with a 160-bit group order. Notes: 1) n denotes the raw data block number, c denotes the replica number,ñ denotes the challenged block number. We set a single raw data block or replica block to 20 bytes because it must be in Z * q . We also set n = 1000. According to the probabilistic framework introduced by [3] , if 1% of the total blocks are corrupted, then the verifier asks for 460 blocks in order to achieve the detection rate of at least 99%, we set n = 460. 2) TB-DMCPDP [25] and MuR-DPA [27] need to transfer verification paths to support dynamic updates, which are not implemented in PB-PMDP [26] , ID-based RDIC [22] and our IDPMR-PDP. To be fair, we do not consider the computation and communication costs invoked by this auxiliary data. 3) Because ID-based RDIC [22] does not support verifying the replica blocks simultaneously, we apply the trivial solution, i.e., to encrypt and verify each replica respectively. 4) All the results represent the means of 10 trails. Analyses: 1) Fig. 2 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for ReplicaGen based on n = 10000. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the time cost (second) for generating all the replica blocks. Our ReplicaGen phase is about 50% faster than that of ID-based RDIC [22] when the replica number c > 3. Because we embed name in the hash function, our ReplicaGen phase is slight slower than that of MuR-DPA [27] , but the difference is nearly negligible. 2) Fig. 3 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for TagGen based on n = 10000. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the time cost (second) for generating all the tags. It is obvious that our IDPMR-PDP has the fastest TagGen phase because only one set of tags is generated for verifying all the replicas. Furthermore, in the TagGen phase of our IDPMR-PDP, the owner can pre-compute H 2 (name||i) η and build a lookup table to accelerate these operations. 3) Fig. 4 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for GenProof based on n = 10000,ñ = 460. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the time cost (second) for generating the proofs of possession. It is obvious that our IDPMR-PDP has the fastest GenProof phase when c > 2, independent to c. 4) Fig. 5 illustrates the comparison on computation costs for CheckProof based on n = 10000,ñ = 460. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the time cost (second) for generating the proofs of possession. It is obvious that our IDPMR-PDP has the fastest CheckProof phase, independent to c. 5) Fig. 6 illustrates the comparison on communication costs for Challenge based on n = 10000,ñ = 460. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the communication cost (byte) for sending the challenges. It is obvious that our IDPMR-PDP has the smallest communication cost (only 84 bytes), independent to c. 6) Fig. 7 illustrates the comparison on communication costs for GenProof based on n = 10000,ñ = 460. The X-label denotes the replica number c and the Y-label denotes the communication cost (byte) for sending the proofs of possession. It is obvious that our IDPMR-PDP has the smallest communication cost when c > 2, independent to c.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSES
We prove our IDPMR-PDP is sound and privacy-preserving in this section. Theorem 1: IDPMR-PDP satisfies the soundness property under Definition 2 and Definition 3. Proof: First, we prove the retrievable property under Definition 2. This part of proof is under the generic group model introduced by Shoup [31] . We show that the probability of any generic algorithm in breaking the retrievable property of IDPMR-PDP is negligible, under the security game defined in Definition 2.
1) Let p be a prime, ξ 1 and ξ 2 : Z p → {0, 1} log 2 p be two independent random encoding functions. The challenger C chooses three groups G 1 , G 2 and G T represented as
A generic algorithm does not exploit the structure of the group, i.e., given an element ξ 1 (x) ∈ G 1 , ξ 2 (x) ∈ G 2 or ξ T (x) ∈ G T , nothing about the element except equality can be inferred. Two oracles, O 1 and O 2 , are used to simulate the group actions on G 1 , G 2 and G T , i.e., for element ξ 
and returns element ξ F 3 ∈ G T . C also chooses a random bit-string ξ ∈ G 2 (represents g) associated with a constant polynomial 1 and a random bits-string ξ α ∈ G 2 (represents mpk) associated with a polynomial α, forwards ξ and ξ α to A. 2) The adversary A makes a sort of queries to C for polynomial times adaptively as follows: a) Hash Queries. For any query to H 1 with ID, C chooses a random bit-string ξ I ∈ G 1 , associates it to a polynomial I and forwards ξ I to A; For any query to H 2 with name||i, C chooses a random bitstring ξ f i ∈ G 1 , associates to a polynomial f i and forwards ξ f i to A; For any query to H 3 , C chooses a random bit-string, which is not a group element, and forwards it to A. If at least one of these elements does not exist, C rejects the operation. Otherwise, C computes
If there exists an element ξ F 3 ∈ G T which has been associated with F 3 , C forwards ξ F 3 to A. Otherwise, C chooses a random bitstring ξ F 3 ∈ G T , associates it to F 3 and forwards ξ F 3 to A. c) Extract Queries. A can query the private key of any identity ID. C looks up an H 1 query with ID.
If not exist, C makes an H 1 query itself. C obtains the element ξ I ∈ G 1 (represents H 1 (ID)) and its corresponding polynomial I . If there exists an element ξ αI ∈ G 1 (represents sk) which has been associated with αI , C forwards ξ αI to A. Otherwise, C chooses a random bit-string ξ αI ∈ G 1 , associates it to αI and forwards ξ αI to A. For each i = 1, . . . , n, if there exists an element ξ F i ∈ G 1 (represents σ i ) which has been associated with F i , C forwards ξ F i to A. Otherwise, C chooses a random bit-string ξ F i ∈ G 1 , associates it with F i and forwards ξ F i to A. C also forwards ξ η and the identity-based signature IDS(ξ η ||name) to A.
3) The adversary A chooses an identity ID * and a file M * = (m * 1 , . . . , m * n * ) under a file name name * and a replica number c * . ID * must not have appeared in Extract Queries and there exist a ReplicaGen query on (M * , name * , c * ) and a TagGen query on (ID * , M * , name * ). We assume that H 1 (ID * ) is associated with the polynomial I * and {H 2 (name * ||i) | i = 1, . . . , n * } are associated with the polynomials {f i * }. C chooses a random numberñ ∈ {1, . . . , n * } and three random numbers τ 1 , τ 2 , τ 3 . C also chooses a random bit-string ξ c 1 ∈ G 2 (represents c 1 ) and associates it with the polynomial ρ, chooses a random bit-string ξ c 2 ∈ G T (represents c 2 ) and associates it with the polynomial I * αρ. Then C forwards ξ c 1 , ξ c 2 ,ñ, τ 1 , τ 2 and τ 3 to A. is to make a query to H 3 with an element ξ * ∈ G T . Due to the unforgeability of the identity-based signature, we can safely assume ξ η (represents r) used in the verification is the one given to A during the TagGen Queries. For A to win with non-negligible probability, ξ * must be associated with a polynomial F * such that The polynomials whose elements are in G 1 and accessed by A are I * , {f i * }, {m i * αI * + ηf i * }. Likewise, the polynomials whose elements are in G 2 and accessed by A are 1, α, η, ρ; the polynomials whose elements are in G T and accessed by A are I * αρ and {F * 1,l · F * 2,l }, where {F * 1,l } are polynomials associated with elements in G 1 and {F * 2,l } are polynomials associated with elements in G 2 . From this, each element in G 1 is associated with a polynomial of the form
where all the coefficients are known to A. Likewise, each element in G 2 is associated with a polynomial of the form
and each element in G T is associated with a polynomial of the form
By expanding F * T and equating the coefficients with F * , we have Second, we prove the unmalleable property under Definition 3. In ReplicaGen Queries, the only parameters known by A from C are the values ψ κ (name||i||j) under the queried tuples (name, i, j) ∈ L. If the cryptographic pseudo-random function ψ is secure, A cannot derive the replica-generation key κ from ψ κ (name||i||j) or derive ψ κ (name * ||i * ||j * ) under (name * , i * , j * ) / ∈ L without knowing κ, by polynomial-time queries. As a result, A cannot generate a block m * i * with a corresponding replica block b * i * ,j * = m * i * + ψ κ (name * ||i * ||j * ) under (name * , i * , j * ) / ∈ L, except possibly with negligible probability, i.e., in order to pass the verifications, the cloud must actually store all the challenged replica blocks, rather than deriving them. This completes the proof of the unmalleable property under Definition 3.
Thus, IDPMR-PDP satisfies the soundness property under Definition 2 and Definition 3. Theorem 1 is proved.
Theorem 2: IDPMR-PDP satisfies the privacy-preserving property under Definition 4.
Proof: In IDPMR-PDP, according to 1, the response R does not contain any information about the raw data file M . In other words, according to the security game given in Definition 4, the following two facts are clear: 1) In First-Phase Queries and Second-Phase Queries, for the same ID, name, n, c, κ, chal and different M , the responses R are always the same. 2) In Challenge, for the same ID * , name * , n * , c * , κ * , chal * , M 0 and M 1 , the responses R 0 = R 1 .
As a result, A learns nothing about the raw data file, both in the query phases and the Challenge phase, i.e., the possibility that A wins the game is 1/2, because M 0 and M 1 are totally indistinguishable. Thus, IDPMR-PDP satisfies the privacy-preserving property under Definition 4. Theorem 2 is proved.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel identity-based public multi-replica provable data possession scheme, namely IDPMR-PDP, to provide third-party verification of outsourced data with multiple replicas without PKI. We introduced a formal security model of public multi-replica PDP schemes and proved the soundness and privacy-preserving properties of IDPMR-PDP under this security model. Meanwhile, our analyses and simulation results demonstrated that our IDPMR-PDP realizes efficient integrity verification, both in computation and communication. 
